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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2239 
___________ 
 
CAROLE MALLORY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC.; 
J. MICHAEL LENNON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-05702) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 10, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 29, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Carole Mallory appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to defendants.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In June 2015, Mallory filed a fourth amended complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against defendants Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. (“S&S”) and J. Michael Lennon for: (1) defamation; (2) defamation per se; 
(3) false light; and (4) commercial disparagement-injurious falsehood.  Mallory’s 
allegations arise from a 2013 biography titled Norman Mailer: A Double Life (“the 
Biography”), which was published by S&S and written by Lennon.  Mallory, who 
engaged in an eight year affair with Mailer, claims that the Biography discusses her 
relationship with Mailer, even though she was never contacted to review the book prior to 
publication, and mischaracterizes her relationship with Mailer as “strictly sexual” when 
in fact the two were in a “long-time, loving relationship.”  
 In July 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mallory’s complaint, which 
the District Court granted in part and denied in part.  The District Court dismissed 
Mallory’s disparagement-injurious falsehood claim in its entirety, and found that five out 
of seven categories of statements Mallory relied on to support her defamation claim were 
incapable of defamatory meaning.  Following discovery, defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  By order entered on May 9, 2017, the District Court granted 
defendants’ motion, concluding that Mallory had not shown that defendants acted with 
actual malice in publishing the Biography.  Mallory subsequently filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied by order entered on July 6, 2017.   
 Mallory appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to 
defendants, arguing primarily that the District Court erred by: (1) applying the actual 
malice standard to her claims because she is no longer a public figure; and (2) finding 
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that she failed to show actual malice.  Mallory also appears to be challenging the District 
Court’s dismissal of her commercial disparagement-injurious falsehood claim. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment to defendants.  Mallory devotes much of her appellate brief to 
challenging the correctness of the District Court’s denial of her motion for 
reconsideration.  Because Mallory failed to file a new or amended notice of appeal 
embracing that order, we lack jurisdiction to review it.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2008).  We exercise 
a plenary standard of review of the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment.  
See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009). 
To state a claim for defamation under Pennsylvania law, Mallory must prove:  
(1) The defamatory character of the communication.  (2) Its publication by 
the defendant.  (3) Its application to the plaintiff.  (4) The understanding by 
the recipient of its defamatory meaning.  (5) The understanding by the 
recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff.  (6) Special harm 
resulting to the plaintiff from its publication.  (7) Abuse of a conditionally 
privileged occasion. 
 
Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 129 A.3d 404, 424 (Pa. 2015) (quoting 42 Pa. Const. 
Stat. Ann. § 8343(a)).  “[A]n opinion cannot be defamatory unless it ‘may reasonably be 
understood to imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying the 
opinion.’”  Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Baker v. 
Lafayette Coll., 532 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. 1987)).  Truth is an affirmative defense.  See 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(b)(1); Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal citations omitted) (“A defendant may avoid liability for defamation if it 
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shows that its statements were ‘substantially true.’”).  When a limited purpose public 
figure1 sues for defamation, the plaintiff must also prove both that the statements were 
false and that they were made with “actual malice.”  Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l 
Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1087 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 
Actual malice is present when a statement is made “with knowledge that it was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.  
Reckless disregard “is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have 
published, or would have investigated before publishing.”  St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. 727, 731 (1968).  Rather, there must be sufficient evidence “that the defendant in 
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”  Id.  “The question 
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding 
of actual malice is a question of law.”  Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989). 
On appeal, Mallory argues that while she may have been a public figure at one 
time, she is now a private citizen, and thus the malice standard does not apply to her.  
However, in the District Court, Mallory expressly conceded that she is a limited purpose 
public figure for the purposes of this case.  She therefore cannot argue to the contrary 
now.  See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 507 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding 
                                                          
1 “[A] limited purpose public figure is ‘an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues.’”  Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 
1082 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)).  
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that plaintiff waived argument on appeal by conceding the point at issue in district court); 
Blanyar v. Genova Prods. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding because 
appellants conceded legal issue in district court, issue was waived on appeal). 
We agree with the District Court that Mallory’s claims that the Biography defames 
her by stating that she was a “star seducer” and that she “picked up” men must fail.  The 
statement that Mallory “picked up” men comes from her own memoir, Loving Mailer, in 
which she stated that “[b]ecause of my looks I’d picked up Bobby De Niro, Sean 
Connery, Richard Gere, Peter Sellers, Matt Dillon, Marcello Matroianni, Warren Beatty, 
Rod Stewart, Clint Eastwood, and Rip Torn.”  Carole Mallory, Loving Mailer 24 (2009).  
As a result, this statement is “substantially true.”  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 8343(b)(1); Graboff, 744 F.3d at 136.  Further, the term “star seducer” is based on this 
same statement from Mallory’s memoir, and is thus either substantially true or non-
actionable opinion.  See Remick, 238 F.3d at 261.  Regardless, we conclude that Mallory 
has not set forth sufficient evidence showing that defendants act with actual malice when 
publishing these statements in the Biography. 
Mallory also claims that the Biography defames her by stating that Mailer said that 
“[s]he was totally on the make.”  Were Mallory accurately representing the record, this 
could potentially raise a triable issue even under an actual-malice standard.  However, 
Lennon’s deposition transcript contradicts Mallory’s assertion that “Mr. Mailer was 
actually talking about a Ms. Millie Brower, not the Plaintiff.”  Br. at 7.  Instead, it 
appears that Lennon’s only misstatement on this point in the Biography is that Mailer was 
asked specifically about Mallory, when, according to the deposition testimony, Mailer 
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was asked about Brower and then responded with a reference to Mallory.  See Dist. Ct. 
Dkt. 107-1 at 60.  That minor inconsistency cannot sustain a defamation claim.  See, e.g., 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991); St. Surin v. Virgin 
Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1316 (3d Cir. 1994); Menkowitz v. Peerless 
Publ’ns, Inc., 176 A.3d 968, 978 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). 
 Finally, Mallory contends that Lennon’s failure to contact her before publishing 
the Biography demonstrates his “reckless disregard for the truth,” i.e., actual malice.  
Specifically, Mallory claims that had Lennon made an effort to interview her, she would 
have informed him that the statements were false.  However, a “failure to investigate, 
standing alone, does not constitute actual malice.”  Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 F.3d 275, 
286 (3d Cir. 2001).  Moreover, the undisputed evidence in this case shows that Lennon 
thoroughly investigated Mailer’s life, interviewing approximately 85 people.  Because 
Lennon was a close friend of and worked with Mailer, he had access to “key individuals” 
to write the book.  For information regarding the relationship between Mallory and 
Mailer, Lennon relied on Mallory’s memoir, personal correspondence, and interviews 
with people who had known about their relationship.  As a result, Mallory has not 
identified any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find defendants were on 
notice that the statements made in the Biography were false.2 
                                                          
2 Summary judgment was equally proper with regard to Mallory’s defamation per se and 
false light claims, as she has not shown that defendants acted with actual malice in 
publishing the statements in the Biography.  See Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1087; Rubin v. 
CBS Broad. Inc., 170 A.3d 560, 568 n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).  To the extent that 
Mallory claims that the District Court erred in dismissing her commercial disparagement-
injurious falsehood claim, we agree with the District Court that she failed to plead what, 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Mallory’s 
motion to supplement the record is denied.  See, e.g., Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 
417, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (a party may supplement the record on appeal in only 
“exceptional circumstances”). 
                                                          
if any, pecuniary loss resulted from the publication of the Biography.  See Pro Golf Mfg., 
Inc. v. Tribune Review Newspaper Co., 809 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 2002).   
